The question is whether there is nasakh (abrogation) in the Holy Quran or not. I understand that I will say that I have not yet seen a verse that is suspended and yet remains in the Holy Quran. Neither the Holy Prophet (sa), nor Abu Bakar (ra) or Umar (ra) ever said anything that supports the idea that such verses are part of the Holy Quran. (Haqaiqul Furqan, Hazrat Hakim Maulvi Noor-ud-Deen, under 2:109. Vol. 3, p. 216) There are usually three verses of the Holy Quran presented as evidence by proponents of the theory of abolition. Therefore, there is no real abrogation in the Qur`an. The verses that would have been abrogated were made only because of a lack of knowledge on how to reconcile different verses. Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh) – whose different schools represent the philosophy of Islamic law – was not immune to various philosophical systems and their false assumptions. A number of false dualisms have arisen in some theories of usul al-fiqh, leading to lengthy debates and differences.
However, some legal theories were aware that, in each of these cases, it was possible to reconcile opposing views in a creative and useful framework. He explained that the theory of abolition would in fact invalidate the entire Qur`an: in the terminology of abolition theory, the term means to suppress the validity of an order contained in a verse of the Holy Quran, so that it is no longer correct to obey it in any context or situation: some verses of the Holy Quran and the accounts of various companions are misinterpreted, to support the theory. Based on the various verses and narratives, the theory of abrogation postulates three types of abrogation that exist in relation to the internal structure of the Holy Quran: The theory of abolition is the idea that there are certain verses of the Qur`an that have been abolished or forgotten. The above logical premises and brief examples are for the introduction to this book only. I feel that what I do plays an important and essential role in the process of contemporary Islamic revival. My topic presents a methodological critique of the theory of abrogation, often misunderstood and misapplied by scholars of antiquity and modern times. I have written about this topic more than once, covering it from different angles and in different contexts. This book summarizes what I have written before and presents my ideas through examples that point to various questions to which the theory of abolition in the sense of abolition has been applied in order to arrive at confirmed and decisive decisions. Nevertheless, we will see that this feeling of abolition is by no means valid from an Islamic point of view. For example, lawyers differ in accepting certain secondary sources as evidence or as a basis for decisions. Some would consider a particular source to be acceptable evidence pointing to a particular conclusion or decision, while others would consider it unacceptable or “erroneous” in the language of legal theorists.
If a source of evidence is acceptable, it can be used as the basis for a decision, while a “false” source is essentially unacceptable in all circumstances and, as such, no decision can be based on it. Examples include al-Shafi`i`s book, Butlan al-Istihsan, or The Invalidity of Subtle Analogy; Dawud`s book, Ibtal al-Qiyas, or “Refuting Analogy”; Ibn al-Rawandi`s book, Ibtal al-Tawatur, or “Refutation of Repetition”; disagreements between the Maliki and Shafi`i schools as to whether or not the actions of the inhabitants of Medina are used as evidence for decisions; and the disagreements between the Zahiris, Ja`faris and Zaydis, on the one hand, and the rest of the fiqh schools, on the other, as to whether the analogy is acceptable as evidence or not. Let`s take another example of false dualism in legal theory known as the “concept of opposite implications” (mafhum al-mukhalafah). All major schools of legal theory, with the exception of the Hanafi school, consider the meaning of the wording of a text in two parts: agreement and disagreement. The notion of disagreement therefore means that if the wording of a text confirms a particular decision, according to the notion of opposing implications, the same formulation confirms its opposite. In other words, the presence of a certain fact logically means the absence of its opposite. Fiqh schools, adopting the concept of opposing implications, divide it into five categories: name, description, condition, scope, and number. Therefore, the mention of one of these five categories in the text of the Qur`an or a hadith means that their opposite does not exist or is false. Hanafi scholars reject this logic, but their rejection is not based on rejecting the concept of false dualisms. They believe that a single reason for a religious text cannot involve two decisions at the same time.
[3] But this is another false dualism. The context of this verse[3] shows that it does not speak of the abolition of the verses of the Holy Qur`an. Rather, it is a response to the unbelievers` request to see a sign of punishment, something the Holy Quran also mentions elsewhere: the concept of opposing implications is also applied to “number.” So, if a verse of the Qur`an or hadith mentions a certain number, then all other numbers are unacceptable according to this concept. It is not possible that another number, even if mentioned in other verses or hadiths, can replace this specified number in the same context. Examples of this are found in the hadiths on zakat and set thresholds for subjection to zakat in various types of goods. These thresholds, which indicate numbers, may differ according to the accounts or hadiths. Most scholars resort to the solution of giving a certain number and rejecting others, either by considering that a particular text has more weight overall, or by inevitable decision, even if different accounts are equally authentic, or by repeal even if the repealed text is confirmed. All this is not religiously required. This book is a critique of such an approach, based on dualism, its reasoning and conclusions.
Even though this verse is addressed exclusively to the Aayaat received by the Prophet Muhammad (sa), it still does not prove that there is a suspension of verses in the Holy Quran. In summary, there is no abolition in the text of the Holy Quran. Each verse and rule applies to all tenses in its own context. In constitutional law, the doctrine of abrogation refers to the power of Congress to waive a state`s sovereign immunity and authorize actions against that state. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not waive a state`s sovereign immunity under Article I of the Constitution.